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Abstract 
We investigate the role of venture capitalists (VCs) in the creation of new technological 
ecosystems and in particular examine how VCs facilitate new ventures’ product 
development decisions to use new technological platforms. Focusing on the recent rapid 
rise of a new computing paradigm, cloud computing, we develop and test a set of 
hypotheses based on a 1999-2009 sample of start-up firms that offer enterprise 
software products. We find evidence of strong complementarity between VC financing 
and the introduction of new products offered over the cloud. Moreover, the 
complementarity effects are significantly stronger for firms backed by VCs that had rich 
experience in the IT industry and are significantly weaker for firms that had prior 
experience developing traditional client/server products. 
Keywords:  Cloud computing, platform ecosystem, venture capital, complementarity 
Introduction 
Following the Schumpeterian insight that in order to bring innovations to the market there is a need for 
both ambitious entrepreneurs and adventurous financiers, the role of finance in the economics of 
innovation became an area of critical research (Schumpeter 1934, 1961). With Venture Capitalists (VCs) 
seen as an important entrepreneurial-financier in our age, research on VCs, their roles, rate of success, 
internal functions, and specific tasks in new businesses growth have seen significant advances in the last 
two decades.  This research has led to a much deeper understanding of some aspects of the role of VCs 
and their business. We know quite a lot on how they are organized, the difference between different kinds 
of VCs, rates of return, impact on helping startups with professionalizing their internal human resources 
and financing operations, and critical role in creating and maintaining networks, to name just few areas 
(Da Rin et al 2011). A body of recent IS research has also begun to investigate the role of VCs, for example 
investigating how they affect product market competition in the IT industry (e.g., Kim et al. 2014), the 
interplay of product characteristics and geographic proximity between IT ventures and VCs (e.g., 
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Greenwood et al. 2010), and the effect of social media platforms on new venture’s VC financing 
opportunities (e.g., Aggarwal et al. 2012).     
However, despite the widely held belief that VCs’ active involvement in all aspects of their invested 
companies is what makes them unique compared with other private equity investments (Da Rin et al 
2011), it might come as a shock to find out that we have very little systematic empirical evidence as to the 
role VCs play in technology development within their invested firms and the resulting paradigmatic shifts 
in technological trajectories. This is a crucial gap in our understanding. As a first step in advancing our 
knowledge in this key area, this study focuses on the role of VCs in the creation of new technological 
ecosystems and in particular examines how VCs facilitate new ventures’ product development decision to 
use new technological platforms.  
Our key argument is that because VCs could provide several benefits to their invested firms during the 
process of developing products using new technological platforms, they play an important coordination 
and instigation roles in the rapid diffusion of new platforms. In this way, they play a similar role to other 
“propagating institutions” such as R&D laboratories, government agencies, consulting firms, and user 
groups on the diffusion of new IT innovations that IS scholars have studied in the past (e.g., Fichman 
2000, King et al. 1994).  
We examine the salience of these arguments by developing and testing a set of hypotheses within the 
setting of the recent rapid rise of a new computing paradigm, cloud computing (hereby: cloud). We 
specifically explore whether VC financing is complementary to a start-up firm’s decision to offer cloud 
products—i.e., whether the returns to software firms producing cloud products is greater in the presence 
of VC financing and vice-versa. Our focus on complementarities reflects the traditional challenges in VC 
research on identifying whether selection or treatment effects are behind the observed empirical 
relationships between VC financing and outcomes (e.g., Sørenson 2007). In our setting, we do not seek to 
identify between sorting and treatment explanations; indeed both may be present in the data and may 
play a role in facilitating the transition to a new platform. 
Our approach to testing complementarities relies on revealed preference. Specifically, we use a firm’s 
decision to offer cloud when funded by a VC as evidence that the returns to offering cloud are greater in 
the presence of VC financing, and vice-versa. Based on a 1999-2009 sample of start-up firms offering 
enterprise software products—one of the first crucial areas to utilize cloud computing, we find that 
receiving VC financing is associated with a 9.1 percentage point increase in the likelihood of launching a 
cloud product. We then demonstrate the robustness of our results using an alternative sample as well as 
an alternative empirical model. We next address potential omitted variable bias concerns by conducting 
instrumental variable estimation. 
We further investigate the circumstances in which the complementarity between VC financing and cloud 
computing could be stronger and weaker. Our empirical results suggest that the complementarity effects 
are significantly stronger for firms backed by VCs that had rich experience in the IT industry and are 
significantly weaker for firms that already had significant experience in developing traditional 
client/server (C/S) products. These results are robust to alternative measures of the VCs’ experience and a 
variety of specifications.  
Theoretical Motivation 
Challenges in developing products on new technological platforms 
For a new technological ecosystem—that is paradigmatic shift in the ways core technologies are used—to 
occur, it is not enough for the technology to be developed, or even for a lead company to develop a 
product, but a whole array of products and functions on a systematic level have to occur in parallel (or at 
least in a short enough period) that companies would then switch to the new technology. For example, it 
was not enough for the personal computer to be invented, and for a significant competition to develop 
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between various PC makers.1  Only after a whole ecosystem of software, services, data-communication, 
and skills evolved around the specific Windows-Intel (also known as Wintel) platform, then companies 
shifted their computing paradigm away from mainframe, mini, and workstation and toward the PC and its 
client-server architecture.  
While it is tempting for start-up firms to develop new product using an emerging technological platform, 
there are several challenges that may prevent the firms from doing so. The first challenge of forming a 
new technological ecosystem is coordinated instigation. Enough actors need to be reassured that other 
actors are working on the different necessary aspects of the technological-business problem so that when 
they come up with their specific solution, it would be viable both technologically and in the market. 
Otherwise it would be irrational for them to invest in its research and development. In more established 
fields, public or public-private solutions for the coordinated instigation problem exist. The most widely 
cited of these solutions is the semiconductors technology development map, which ensured a widespread 
agreement on goals, standards and timeframes and stimulated investment from a wide array of actors 
spread around the globe to come forth and achieve its stated goals of technological development. 
However, in cases of unproven new technologies, where markets do not exist, and no one is quite sure 
what the new technologies are supposed to perform and what are (if any) the profitable business models, 
there is no established private-public mechanism to play that coordination role. 
Meanwhile, to develop new products using an unproven technological platform, various problems need to 
be tackled by the firms themselves, as there is no prior experience or know-how to learn from (Greenstein 
2000). Only firms with the best technical team could have the ability to encounter all difficulties and take 
the lead on the new technological trajectory.  
Yet, even the start-up firms with the best quality may incur substantial costs and risks when launching 
new products based upon an emerging platform. The first are learning and search costs associated with 
developing products compatible with the new platform. Because the ways core technologies are used may 
be completely different from the old platform, the start-up firms would need to develop new technical 
components or change the old designs completely. This problem becomes more acute if there are some 
missing components the start-ups need to license from others, a common phenomenon for industries 
featured with overlapping intellectual property rights (e.g., Cockburn and MacGarvie 2009). The 
potentially high licensing and transaction costs may prevent the firms from entering into markets using 
the new platform in the first place. Second, commercializing new products on an unproven platform may 
be costly and risky, and is likely to involve economic experiments to understand how opportunities 
enabled by the new platform can be translated into feasible business models (e.g., Rosenberg 1992).  
As an example, consider the recent shift from the C/S computing paradigm to cloud computing: in order 
to launch a software-as-a-service product to the market, the start-up firms not only need to identify new 
business models and sort out licensing and legal issues, but also need to take tremendous efforts to re-
organize the entire organization (e.g., cutting the technical teams that are supposed to provide on-site 
services under the traditional C/S model) and spend a fortune to advocate the new technology to the 
market. For instance, to promote its on-demand CRM product, Salesforce.com spends roughly 50% of its 
yearly revenues on marketing expenses, resulting in a thin profit margin.  
It is worth noting that the above discussions are not intended to provide a comprehensive list of 
challenges that the start-up firms could face when developing new products on an unproven technological 
platform. Here we focus on just some of the more common problems that could be potentially addressed 
by the VCs. Our next section will therefore discuss the roles of VCs in addressing these challenges. 
                                                             
1 The “prominence” of the IBM PC is now so etched into our public mythology that a little known fact is that the 
bestselling home computer of all time was actually the Commodore 64, which outperformed IBM PC and its clones in 
the global market until 1988. 
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The role of VCs in complementing firm’s product development on new 
technological platforms 
VC firms (or funds) are organized as partnerships between General Partners (GPs) and Limited Partners 
(LPs). GPs are a small set of individuals who make the investment choices and who assert active 
management and are involved in several of the companies the fund invested in. LPs are a set of 
institutional and/or rich individuals who passively invest in a VC fund (usually active for ten years) who 
supply the capital. The GPs are the individuals whose profession is being the venture capitalists.  The GPs 
make their money in the form of management fees and carry (performance based fees), the LPs make (or 
lose) their money when the VC fund distributes the returns after successful exits (that is either IPO or 
M&A). The ability of GPs to stay in business relies on their capability to raise successful funds on a regular 
basis, which in turns relies on their ability to supply the LPs with reasonable return on investment via 
successful financial exits. Notice that this model means that, unlike the popular media description of VC 
as long-term investment, the VCs usually aim to perform a financial exit within five years of investing in a 
company. 
The literature has suggested the following several roles played by VCs. First, it has been argued that VCs 
are able to screen and identify better quality ideas and firms. Chemmanur et al. (2011) show evidence that 
the efficiency of VC-backed firms before receiving VC fund is even higher than that of non-VC-backed 
firms, suggesting the screening role played by VCs. Regarding their role particularly in picking firms with 
the best innovations, Hellmann and Puri (2000) show that companies that are following innovator 
strategies are more likely to get VC funding than these that pursue imitation. Indeed, when we 
interviewed a prominent Silicon Valley VC for the project we were told: “We at <name of fund> have 
made specific investments so we are allowed into the best labs in Stanford and Berkeley and employ 
enough researchers as consultant to be able to know of new technological trends as soon as they appear. 
We find this very worthwhile over the years leading to some of our best “hits.” Therefore, we argue that 
because VCs tend to develop various techniques with which to keep abreast of new trends and 
technologies, they could act as a catalyst to the shift into a new technological platform by aggressively 
selecting the best firms and betting on them early. By doing so the VC industry mobilizes enough capital 
around new technological trajectories to sponsor the creation of a vibrant ecosystem that makes the 
switch to new technologies sensible from the point of view of customers and consumers. 
VCs also play an important role as information intermediaries (e.g., Hsu 2006) for their invested firms.  
Because of their strong network of information and contacts, the VCs could provide private information 
access and reduce search costs for their invested firms, and they could also be more aware of the potential 
opportunities and threats than internal directors of the firms (Gans et al. 2002, Hsu 2006). In our setting, 
this function could significantly help the start-ups efficiently learn and develop new products that fit with 
the new platform. In addition to the information intermediation, when start-ups need to negotiate certain 
missing components from external actors, VCs could potentially serve as bargaining intermediaries to 
facilitate the transactions (Gans et al. 2002). In sum, these discussions suggest the important influence by 
VCs in reducing a variety of costs associated with developing products on a new platform.  
A body of studies has investigated the effects of active management exerted by VCs on the value of the 
firms. Besides monitoring the invested firms (e.g., Lerner 1995), VCs also play an important role in 
building the internal organization, formulating human resource policies, or hiring VP of sales and 
marketing (Hellmann and Puri 2002). We argue all these extra-financial value-added services could 
effectively assist the firms to sort through all the issues discussed above related to commercializing the 
products based on new platform.  
All the foregoing discussions suggest the significant role of VCs in addressing the challenges of developing 
products on an unproven platform. They motivate our argument that because VCs increase the net 
benefits from developing new products on an emerging platform, all else equal, we would expect a strong 
complementarity between VC financing and launching products on a new technological platform.   
Both theory and some findings (e.g., Bottazzi et al. 2008, Gompers et al. 2009) suggest that the more 
experienced are the VCs as technologists and entrepreneurs, the better they are in performing the 
functions described above, including selecting the best ideas and firms, mitigating costs involved with new 
product development, as well as providing active management guidance. As a result, we expect the 
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complementarity between VC financing and launching product on a new platform will be stronger when 
VCs have gained a rich experience in the focal industry.  
Last, some start-ups may already have experience in developing products for a prior platform. The 
informational benefits of VCs may be lower for such firms, leading to a weaker complementarity. There 
may be several reasons for this. First, to the extent such firms may have already invested significant sunk 
costs in developing products under the old platform, there may be lower net benefits for developing 
products for the new platform. This will be particularly true in environments where lessons learned on 
one platform may not easily be transferred to the new environment (e.g., Davis et al. 2014), as may be the 
case with cloud computing. For example, the firm may have developed technical capabilities around 
delivering products and services in the old platform. It may have also developed an understanding of 
business models that may work under the old platform; such as a service and support model whose 
economics may be well suited to traditional C/S products. If these capabilities are not well situated to the 
new environment then VC financing may not have as great an impact on how products and services are 
delivered (e.g., Penrose 2009). Further, some prior literature has argued that firms’ existing capabilities 
make themselves difficult to adapt to new circumstances (e.g., Nelson and Winter 1982; Teece et al. 1997; 
Tripsas and Gavetti 2000). In our environment, prior experience with the old platform could create 
inertia that is difficult to overcome, even with access to new information from the VC.  
To investigate these hypothesized influences of VCs, we look at the early stages of a new paradigmatic 
technological shift, i.e. the period before the technology acceptance curve took off and the emergence of 
an ecosystem of complementary institutions and services. We focus on the recent movement from 
traditional C/S computing to the cloud. Cloud computing is now widely accepted as the new paradigm of 
computing that slowly revolutionizes the ways in which computing is used, and by whom, throughout all 
sectors of the economy. However, in order to realize its promise it was not enough that it was just offered 
as an infrastructure, for example, software or storage as a service, but a whole ecosystem of how 
computing is organized,  and how software and equipment are developed. Business models have had to be 
developed at more or less the same time in order for the option to move to cloud would make sense on 
large scale. Accordingly, it supplies a rich case with which to check how VCs influenced firm decisions on 
developing products based on the new, yet-to-be-proven paradigm. Based on our discussions above, we 
immediately have the following three testable hypotheses in this context: 
Hypothesis 1 – VC financing is associated with an increase in the likelihood of initial cloud product launch 
by a start-up firm. 
Hypothesis 2 – VC financing is associated with a greater increase in the likelihood of initial cloud product 
launch when the VC has rich experience in IT industry. 
Hypothesis 3 –VC financing is associated with a smaller increase in the likelihood of initial cloud product 
launch for a start-up firm that has rich product experience.  
Empirical framework 
In short, we argue that VC financing is complementary to the introduction of new products offered over 
the cloud; that is, the returns to VC financing for start-up firms will be greater when the start-up offers 
cloud products, and vice-versa (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Milgron 2013). Our approach to testing for 
complementarities between VC financing and cloud relies on revealed preferences. We follow the 
empirical approach of Novak and Stern (2009). Suppose there is an observable binary status on whether a 
firm launches its initial cloud product, denoted as k = Initial cloud product launch, with net benefits to 
the firm denoted by β k .  Both the firm i and the econometrician observe a vector of decision-specific 
drivers Z ki with marginal returns to the firm as δ k. There are also some decision-specific mean-zero 
shocks η ki, which are observed by the firm but not the econometrician, and can be composed into ξ i (i.e. 
firm-level shock for firm i) and ε ki (i.e. some shock particularly related to firm i’s cloud product launch 
decision).  
Assume firms will launch the cloud when the net benefits to this decision are positive. Given the 
discussions above on how VC increases the net benefits from developing cloud product, the marginal 
returns to cloud product launch also depend upon the existence of VC financing. Therefore, we have: 
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Initial cloud product launch i = 1 if λ VC i + β k + δ k Z ki + ξ i + ε ki >0, where k= Initial cloud product 
launch.                (1) 
In equation (1), λ captures the benefits from VC (an observable binary status on whether the firm has 
successfully attracted VC financing) to the marginal returns to cloud product launch. Our main objective 
of the empirical analysis is to determine whether λ is greater than zero. If we convert equation (2) to a 
linear probability model, it can be written as follows:  
Initial cloud product launch i = λ VC i + δ k Z ki + η ki, where k= Initial cloud product launch.       (2) 
Because the firm-level shock ξ i is included in η ki, a cross-sectional estimation using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) will lead to a biased estimate of λ, since ξ i might be also correlated with VC financing (i.e. 
VC i). For example, a positive λ may not be caused by the complementarity between the two; instead, it 
might occur if a firm with an excellent team of internal directors would tend to attract VC financing as 
well as launching product based on the new cloud platform. To address this concern, we construct a panel 
and employ a fixed-effect linear probability model to eliminate any firm-level time-invariant 
unobservables that could correlate with both the status of receiving VC financing and the status of 
launching cloud product. More specifically, if we suppress the k subscript on our parameters in equation 
(2) to simplify notation, the baseline empirical model based on panel data can be written as: 
Initial cloud product launch it = λ VC it + δ Z it + µ i + τ t + η it           (3)  
Initial cloud product launch it is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if firm i launches its first cloud product 
in year t and is equal to 0 otherwise; VC it is also a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if firm i has received 
VC by year t and 0 otherwise. The parameter λ captures the complementarity and our interest is to test 
whether λ>0. Z it is a set of control variables that vary by firm and by year and could potentially influence 
firm’s decision to launch cloud product. µ i represents the time-invariant unobserved firm heterogeneity 
and τ t is the full set of time dummies that control for general time trends that may be correlated with both 
the chance of receiving VC and the likelihood of launching cloud.  
Nevertheless, one could still argue that some time-varying components in η it, which are not observed by 
the econometrician, may be correlated with both the firm’s status of receiving VC financing and launching 
a cloud product. As shown below, we employ instrumental variable regressions to address this concern. 
Data and Measures 
Sample 
We created a sample of start-up firms that offer enterprise software products—one of the first crucial 
areas of computing to utilize cloud computing, and in particular the software-as-a-service model2. We 
focus on enterprise software to reduce the extent of unobserved heterogeneity in our sample, as both the 
incidence of VC funding and the cloud business model may be influenced by many unobserved factors. 
Further, some of the most popular early providers of cloud application services operated in enterprise 
software, such as Salesforce.com. Last, and related, in contrast to many consumer software apps that were 
built specifically to offer services over the Internet—such as some of Google’s applications—because many 
enterprise software firms are operating on client data they faced a clear choice between developing cloud 
solutions and offering traditional C/S products. The sample firms come from the 2003, 2004, and 2010 
editions of CorpTech Directory of Technology Firms (denoted as CorpTech hereafter) with primary SIC 
code as 7372. Based on the product categories defined by CorpTech, we selected the firms that produce 
enterprise applications such as accounting, business planning, banking, manufacturing, sales and 
marketing, warehousing and distribution applications.3 Our sample begins in 1999 (the last year in which 
the concept cloud computing was not yet formed) to 2009, a year by which every start-up formed should 
have been exposed to the idea of offering cloud products as the term became ubiquitous and widely 
accepted as the new and upcoming computing platform. 
                                                             
2 That is, give our focus on software firms, the terms “cloud product” and “software-as-a-service” are interchangeable.  
3 There are more than 290 software product codes (denoted as SOF) defined by CorpTech Directory. Each firm in this 
directory is associated with a set of self-reported product codes selected from these 290 SOF categories. 
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While our CorpTech data has detailed information on the product market segments of firms, it does not 
vary over time from year 2005 to 2009. Therefore, we combine the data extracted from CorpTech with the 
data from the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) Database, which includes 100,000 U.S.-based 
firms primarily in SIC 7372 and provides longitudinal information over 1990-2009 on sales, employment, 
location, and other basic variables. In order to focus on start-up firms only, we restrict the sample to firms 
that were founded after 1990 and that have fewer than 1000 employees and less than $500 million annual 
sales, which gives us 339 firms in total. 
Variables 
Dependent variable: Initial cloud product launch 
This variable captures whether a start-up firm i launched its first cloud product in year t. To identify 
initial cloud product launch event, we took each firm’s name and searched for its press releases in the 
PROMT database, as has been done previously in the literature (Fosfuri et al. 2008). Then, we employed a 
combination of automatic search and manual reading to identify the sample firms’ product introduction 
events. Third, we followed the definition of cloud computing by Kushida et al. (2010) and derived a set of 
keywords related to cloud in the software-as-a-service (SaaS) category, as our sample firms primarily 
produce enterprise software products. These keywords not only include more generic ones such as cloud, 
cloud computing, and software-as-a-service, but also include phrases describing the features of cloud 
computing business model, such as on-demand, pay-as-you-go, and subscription-basis. We then used a 
text mining tool and searched for these keywords in the set of new product introduction articles. Lastly, 
we manually read all search results to ensure we have correctly identified cloud product introductions. In 
total, among the 339 sample firms, we found 52 firms that introduced cloud products over our sample 
period. 
Because we are interested in the role of VCs in promoting cloud computing ahead of the technology 
acceptance curve (i.e. the period prior to widespread acceptance of cloud computing), the focus of our 
empirical analysis is on the initial cloud product launch. Therefore, we dropped all observations for a firm 
once it introduced its first cloud product, as the firm is no longer exposed to the hazard of offering an 
initial cloud product. Moreover, among the 339 sample firms, we find 72 firms that received VC before our 
first sample year (i.e. 1999). Because we are particularly interested in investigating how the change in VC-
funding status complements the decision to launch cloud products, we construct our baseline sample by 
dropping these 72 firms. However, as discussed below, we test the robustness of our results by using the 
full sample. In summary, our baseline sample consists of an unbalanced panel with 2325 observations by 
267 firms from 1999 to 2009.  Table 1 includes summary statistics for the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis over our entire sample period.  
 Baseline sample 
Sample of firms that launched 
cloud 
Sample of firms that did not 
launch cloud 
Difference  
(t-statistics) 
Variable names Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Launch cloud 
vs. Not Initial cloud 
product launch 
.018 .133 0 1 
VC .208 .406 0 1 .409 .493 0 1 .187 .390 0 1 7.835*** 
VC’s prior 5-
year experience  
2.634 8.835 0 66 11.357 19.329 0 66 1.722 6.208 0 37 16.237*** 
product 
experience 
5.107 11.513 0 110 6.336 9.604 0 65 4.978 11.689 0 110 1.666** 
Sales  4.081 11.879 0 231 7.179 13.838 0 111.29 3.757 11.611 0 231 4.079*** 
Downstream 
capabilities  
.003 .009 0 .219 .001 .003 0 .037 .003 .010 0 .219 -1.931** 
Innovations  .012 .067 0 .970 .006 .030 0 .303 .012 .070 0 .97 -1.300* 
Age 8.421 4.811 1 20 6.991 3.951 1 17 8.570 4.869 1 20 -4.653*** 
Note: 1) the baseline sample includes 2325 observations by 267 firms; the sample of firms that launched cloud includes 220 observations by 42 firms; 
the sample of firms that did not launch cloud includes 2105 observations by 225 firms. 2) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Independent variables 
VC. This variable indicates if a firm i had received any VC financing by year t. We followed a large body of 
literature (e.g., Chemmanur et al. 2011, Tian 2011) and use the VentureXpert database by Thomson 
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Financial Corporation as the primary data source for this variable. VentureXpert provides detailed round-
by-round information for firms that VCs invest in, including the date for each round of investment, round 
number, round amount, syndicating VCs, and the total investment amount by each VC. We matched our 
sample firms with firms in VentureXpert and found 145 firms had received VC funding by 2009, including 
72 firms that received VC funding before 1999. Following the literature (e.g., Hsu 2006), we consider 
receiving VC as an absorbing state. Therefore, if a firm i received the first round VC funding in year t, the 
variable VC will take the value of 1 in year t and all following years, and otherwise it will be equal to 0.  
VC experience. For a VC-backed firm i, this variable refers to the lead VC’s IT-related experience. To avoid 
potential endogeneity, we focus on the pre-sample VC experience. We use the lead VC’s prior 5-year 
experience (denoted as VC’s prior 5-year experience) as the baseline measure, as we believe using the 
prior 5-year window reflects VC’s most recent investment focus and expertise. However, we also use the 
lead VC’s prior 10-year experience (denoted as VC’s prior 10-year experience) as a robustness check.  The 
measure of lead VC’s IT-related experience is computed in three steps. First, to identify the lead VC for a 
VC-backed firm in our sample, we follow the existing literature (e.g., Tian 2011) and consider the VC that 
provided the greatest investment across all rounds and that participated in the first round funding as the 
lead VC. Second, we extracted all VC funding activities in portfolio companies operating in the 
information technology (IT) industry from VentureXpert, and then for each VC, we counted the number 
of IT firms in which the VC invested as the first round investor from 1994 to 1998 as a measure of the VC’s 
prior 5-year experience (we used investments from 1989 to 1998 as a measure of the VC’s prior 10-year 
experience). Third, we matched the VCs (from the second step) with lead VCs that invested in our sample 
firm (from the first step) so that we know for each VC-backed sample firm, its lead VC’s experience in the 
IT industry as early-stage investor. For firms backed by multiple lead VCs, we use the average experience.4 
Product experience. This variable captures the focal firm i’s experience in producing traditional C/S 
software products by year t and is measured by the cumulative count of C/S products introduced by firm i 
from year 1999 to year t. We use a two-step procedure to identify the introduction of C/S products based 
on the press releases in the PROMT database. First, we manually read all the news articles by the 339 
sample firms and identify new software product introductions. Second, we define a new software product 
introduction event as a C/S product introduction as long as it does not include any keywords related to 
cloud as described above. Given the data limitation that we only obtained product introduction events 
after 1999, we acknowledge that using the count of C/S products introduced from 1999 to year t is an 
imprecise measure for a firm’s total C/S products cumulated to year t. However, as detailed below, the 
employment of fixed-effect model will control for any time-invariant effect that differs across firms, 
including the pre-sample C/S product count. 
Control variables 
Downstream capabilities. As has been suggested by Fosfuri et al. (2008), when a firm invested heavily in 
its marketing efforts, brands, and distribution channels, the firm is less likely to introduce new products 
because of a fear of eroding profits in existing business. Meanwhile, a firm’s downstream capabilities will 
also be likely to correlate with the opportunity of VC funding. To control for this effect, following prior 
literature (e.g., Huang et al. 2013), we extract trademark data from USPTO and use the count of live 
trademarks (in thousands) held by firm i up to year t as a measure of the firm’s downstream capabilities. 
Innovations. Prior literature (e.g., Mann and Sager 2007) has highlighted that VCs tend to fund firms 
with demonstrated innovation capabilities. On the other hand, a highly innovative firm will be more likely 
to enter into new technology paradigms such as cloud computing. In line with the existing literature that 
studies the relation of VC to firm innovation output (e.g., Kortum and Lerner 2000), we use patents as a 
measure of firm’s innovation output and add it as a control in the empirical analysis. For a firm i, we 
obtained its granted patents as well as patent applications cumulated up to year t from the NBER Patent 
Data Project and USPTO website. We use claims-weighted counts (in thousand) of granted patents for 
firm i up to year t as the baseline measure, as it is the patent’s claims that determine the economic value of 
                                                             
4 We checked the robustness of our results by using the total (instead of the average) experience if a sample firm has 
multiple lead VCs. The results are very consistent and available upon request. 
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a patent. We further use the raw count of granted patents, the claims-weighted count of patent 
applications, and raw count of patent applications for firm i up to year t as robustness check, which gives 
us consistent results. 
Other controls. To control for firm size-related effects that could influence both the chance of receiving VC 
funding and the likelihood of launching cloud products, we obtain the longitudinal sales (in million) data 
during the 1999-2009 period from the NETS Database as a measure of firm size (denoted as sales). We 
also examine the robustness of our results by using the number of employees as an alternative measure, 
the data of which is also directly obtained from the NETS database. The results are consistent with using 
sales as a control.5  As has been discussed elsewhere, firm age is also an important factor that affects both 
a firm’s financing opportunity and the firm’s product strategies. Unfortunately, because firm age is highly 
collinear with the full set of yearly dummies used to control for year-fixed effects, we were unable to add 
firm age as a control in the fixed effect linear probability model, but it is included when we test the 
robustness of the results using Cox proportional hazard model.  
Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in several steps. First, we investigate the role of VC in complementing a 
firm’s cloud product launch decision using the above baseline empirical framework. Then, we test the 
robustness of the results through a different sampling strategy and an alternative empirical model. We 
further try to address omitted variable bias by employing instrumental variable estimation. We then 
demonstrate how the influence by VC is shaped by VC’s past experience in IT industry and the start-up 
firm’s existing product experience, and whether these results are consistent to alternative measure and 
specifications. 
Baseline results and robustness tests 
Figure 1 presents a time-series chart of the cumulative percentage of the sample firms that launched 
initial cloud products, for VC-backed versus non VC-backed firms. Overall, while firms rarely entered into 
cloud computing business before 2002, there is a significant rise from 2003 to 2006, however the rate of 
increase slows after 2006. Moreover, there is a significant difference in the percentage and speed of cloud 
product launch between VC-backed and non-VC firms.  
 
Figure 1: Cumulative percentage of firms introducing cloud product, 
VC-backed firms vs. Non-VC firms 
Besides presenting the summary statistics of our major variables using the full sample, in table 1, we also 
slice the sample into a subsample of firms that offer the cloud versus a subsample that does not, and 
conduct a non-parametric test of the difference of these variables between the two subsamples. As shown 
in table 1, for sample firms that launch cloud products, they are more likely to be funded by VCs and their 
VCs seem to exhibit greater level of IT-related experience than sample firms that do not launch cloud 
products. Further, firms who release cloud products have a greater level of product experience and have 
                                                             
5 We did not use both sales and employment as controls for firm size, as these two variables are highly correlated. 
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greater sales volume. On the other hand, the firms that do not launch cloud seem to have greater 
downstream capabilities (as proxied by the number of live trademarks), have filed more patents, and are 
older. 
In columns (1) and (2) in table 2, we use the regression model in equation (3) to explore the basic 
relationship between VC and a firm’s cloud launch decision. Column (1) shows the relationship between 
VC and Initial cloud product launch with only sales as a control. We include sales in all regressions 
because it may affect a firm’s likelihood of receiving VC funding as well as its likelihood of launching a 
cloud product. The coefficient on VC is .091, suggesting that receiving VC financing is associated with a 9.1 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of launching cloud product. Column (2) employs the full set of 
our baseline controls, and the results are very similar to column (1). 
As discussed earlier, our baseline sample drops the firms that received VC funding before the sample 
period (i.e. before 1999). However, it would be interesting to test the robustness of our results by 
incorporating those dropped firms. The results using the full sample are reported in columns (3) and (4) 
in table 2, which remains consistent to the baseline results.  
We choose linear probability model as our baseline specification because it enables us to employ a firm-
level fixed effects to control for time-variant unobservables. The interpretation of the implied marginal 
effects is also easier in this model. As an additional robustness check, we employ hazard models as an 
alternative specification, as it is in particular useful to model the risk of events occuring at time t, given 
the subject has survived until time t.  More specifically, we choose the Cox proportional hazard model, as 
it is a semi-parametric model that makes no assumption on the shape of the baseline hazard over time 
and assumes that covariates are multiplicatively related to the hazard. In our setting, suppose hi (t |Xit) = 
h0(t)*exp(Xit’β), where hi (t |Xit) is the conditional instantaneous hazard rate for firm i in year t to launch 
cloud products. h0(t) is the unspecified baseline hazard in year t, and Xit’β = β1VCit + β2Salesit + 
β3Downstream capabilitiesit + β4Innovationsit + β5Ageit + τt.  
The results based on the Cox proportional hazard model are presented in columns (5) and (6) in table 2.  
The estimated coefficients suggest that once a firm received VC funding (i.e. the variable VC has a discrete 
change from 0 to 1), the firm exhibit a 144% increase in the hazard rate of launching cloud product.  
Dependent variable: Initial 
cloud product launch 
Baseline sample, OLS Full sample, OLS 
Baseline sample, Cox 
proportional hazard models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VC 
.091*** 
(.034) 
.091*** 
(.034) 
.090*** 
(.034) 
.090*** 
(.034) 
1.440*** 
(.343) 
1.443*** 
(.342) 
Sales 
.001* 
(.001) 
.001* 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.015** 
(.006) 
.015**  
(.006) 
Downstream capabilities  
.034 
(.008) 
 
.024 
(.248) 
 
-27.682 
(31.869) 
Innovations  
.029 
(.093) 
 
-.010  
(.010) 
 
-.621  
(2.540) 
Age     
.021   
(.051) 
.020  
(.051) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Number of firms 267 267 339 339 260 260 
Number of observations 2325 2325 3004 3004 2058 2058 
Notes: 1) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over firms are in parentheses. 2) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant 
at 1%. 3) Although the coefficient and the robust standard error of Sales look the same across specifications, it is because we round up the robust 
standard error to 3-digit. The robust standard error of Sales is mostly around .0005, and the coefficient of Sales is mostly significantly positive at 10%. 
Table 2: The complementarity between VC financing and cloud product launch 
Addressing omitted variable bias 
Although the fixed effect linear probability model in the previous section addresses time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms, one important concern is that some time-varying omitted 
variables may correlate with both a firm’s tendency to launch cloud and its opportunity to obtain VC 
funding, leading to a biased estimate of the variable VC.  Therefore, we take the following steps to conduct 
an instrumental variable estimation.  
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Our first step is to identify variables that are likely correlated with a firm’s likelihood to receive VC but is 
uncorrelated with firm-level unobservables such as new product development strategy. Following 
Chemmanur et al. (2011), our first variable is the number of limited partners that invested in VC funds 
existing over the prior 5-year rolling window and located in the same state as the sample company. This 
variable is correlated with the likelihood that a company will receive VC funding but is unlikely to be 
correlated with a company’s product strategy, as limited partners usually don’t interact with portfolio 
companies directly. Using limited partners in the same state is based on the assumption that, as 
articulated by Chemmanur et al. (2011), the greater the number of limited partners in geographic 
proximity to the sample firms, the more likely for the local VCs to raise funds, and therefore the greater 
chance for the firms to be backed by VC.  
Second, as Hochberg and Rauh (2012) suggested, different types of institutional investors may exhibit 
different tendencies to invest locally. Public pension funds may in particular show home bias. Therefore, 
our second variable is the number of public pension funds that invested in VC funds over the prior 5-year 
rolling window and located in the same state as the sample company.  
Third, in line with the approach taken by Kolev (2013), the third variable is the total dollar value of VC-
backed initial public offerings (IPOs) in all non-IT industries in the prior 2 years and in the same state as 
the sample company. The logic of using this variable is discussed in great detail in Kolev (2013). In short, 
first, given the usual venture capital cycle,6 there is a significant correlation between the IPOs in the 
previous cycle and the supply of VC funding into new ventures in the next cycle. Therefore, the more IPOs 
in prior years, the more likely it is that our sample firms will receive VC funding in the current period. We 
measure the prior two years of IPOs because, as argued by Kolev (2013), it provides the strongest power in 
predicting future investment. Meanwhile, because IPOs are usually driven by financial market conditions, 
they should not influence a firm’s product development strategy. To further rule out any possible 
correlation between IPOs and our dependent variable, we only focus on the IPOs realized in non-IT 
industries. The focus on IPOs in the same state is in the same spirit as the above first instrument, i.e. the 
home bias exhibited by the supply of VC funds. Following a similar logic, for our fourth instrument we 
also identify the total number of mergers and acquisitions (M&As)7 in all non-IT industries in the prior 2 
years and in the same state.  
Last, we use a dummy measure for these four variables (i.e. taking a value of 1 if it is above 50th percentile 
and otherwise 0), as this is a straightforward way to incorporate nonlinearities of their effects on VC 
funding. We further interact each of them with a linear time trend (denoted as High limited partners X 
time trend, High public pension funds X time trend, High IPOs X time trend, and High M&As X time 
trend), because their results are likely to vary over time. 
Following prior literature (Angrist and Pischke 2009), our second step is to employ a probit model to 
predict the likelihood a firm receives VC funding by using these four variables as the predictors. The 
results are reported in column (1) in table 3.  The number of limited partners and the number of M&As 
seem to strongly and positively predict the chance to get VC funding, though we do not find a similar 
effect from public pension funds and IPOs. 
The next step is use the predicted likelihood of receiving VC funding from this probability model in 
column (1) as the instrument. Because all of the above four factors should not be correlated with firm-
level unobservables that might affect product development decisions, this predicted value should not be 
correlated with these unobservables either. Using nonlinear fitted values of instruments in this way has 
been shown to have greater efficiency than a traditional linear first stage but still provide consistent 
estimates (Angrist 2001, Newey 1990). We then estimate a fixed effects linear probability model with 
instrumental variables and report the results from the two stages in columns (2) and (3) in table 3 
respectively. As expected, in the first stage, the predicted value of the likelihood of receiving VC financing 
                                                             
6 The venture capital cycle refers to the cycle that starts with the funding of new ventures, continues onto developing 
those new ventures into mature firms, and then the exit through IPOs or acquisitions. It closes with the VC re-
investing into new ventures. 
7 Unfortunately, most of M&As in our dataset have missing transaction values, so we are only able to compute the 
number of M&As instead of the dollar value of M&As. 
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based on the above four factors are strongly correlated with a firm’s true VC funding status. The F-statistic 
is 18.16, above the commonly used threshold of 10 and also above the Stock-Yogo (2005) critical threshold 
for weak instruments. The results from the second stage show the sign of the coefficient of VC variable is 
consistent with the baseline result, though the magnitude and standard error are somewhat greater. In 
sum, this set of results using instrumental variable provide us additional confidence that our results were 
not driven by omitted factors.   
 
Probit model with DV as 
whether firm i in year t 
had received VC 
Fixed effects linear probability model with instrumental variable 
First stage Second stage 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
High limited partners X 
time trend 
.097***  
(.021) 
Predicted 
probability of 
receiving VC 
funding 
.321***   
(.075) 
 
VC 
.315* 
(.172) 
High public pension funds 
X time trend 
-.031 
 (.020) 
Sales 
-.001 
(.001) 
Sales 
.001* 
(.001) 
High IPOs X time trend 
-.006  
(.014) 
Downstream 
capabilities 
.110 
(.292) 
Downstream 
capabilities 
.008 
(.205) 
High M&As X time trend 
.045***  
(.013) 
Innovations 
-.014 
(.116) 
Innovations 
.014 
(.077) 
Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes Year dummies Yes 
Firm fixed effect No Firm fixed effect Yes Firm fixed effect Yes 
F-statistic 18.16  -- 
Stock-Yogo (2005) critical value (10% maximal IV size) 16.38  -- 
Notes: 1) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over firms are in parentheses. 2) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant 
at 1%. 
Table 3: The complementarity between VC financing and cloud product launch, 
instrumental variable estimates 
Examining when the complementarity is stronger or weaker 
We have examined the average effect of VC in complementing a firm’s new product development decision 
(i.e. launch cloud product in our setting). In this section, we investigate the circumstances under which 
such complementarity is likely to be stronger or weaker. Our hypothesis suggests the complementarity is 
stronger when a firm is backed by a VC that has rich experience in IT industry. We test this hypothesis by 
adding the interaction between VC and VC experience to the regression model. As shown in column (1) in 
table 4, the estimated marginal effects suggest that firms backed by VC that has little experience in IT 
industry are associated with a 5.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of launching cloud product, 
and this effect is statistically insignificant. On the other hand, firms backed by VC that has rich experience 
in IT industry are associated with a statistically significant 7.4 percentage point increase in the likelihood 
of launching cloud product.  As implied by the coefficient of the interaction term, the two marginal effects 
(at the 10th and 90th percentiles of VC experience) are statistically significant. We then examine the 
robustness of the results by measuring VC experience using prior-1o year experience, and the results are 
very consistent, as shown in column (2) in table 4. These results provide strong evidence on the important 
role of VCs’ experience on its influence on the product development trajectory of their invested 
companies. 
We next explore how a firm’s existing product experience shapes the complementarity between VC and a 
firm’s product development decision. We add the interaction between VC and a firm’s product experience 
to our baseline model. As reported in column (3) in table 4, receiving VC funding is associated with a 11.5 
percentage point increase in the likelihood of launching cloud for firms that have low product experience 
but is only associated with a 8.6 percentage point increase for firms that have rich product experience. 
The coefficient on the interaction term suggests a statistically significant difference between low and high 
product experience.  
However, start-ups with low product experience also imply they are younger, so one explanation on the 
stronger effect of VC on a firm with little product experience is that this type of firm is likely to be younger 
and thus requires VC’s greater intervention. To disentangle this age effect from product experience effect, 
we add the interaction between firm age and VC (denoted as VC x firm age) to the regression model. The 
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results are reported in column (4) in table 4. The coefficient on VC x product experience remains 
significantly negative.  
Dependent variable: 
Initial cloud 
product launch 
VC’s prior 
5-year 
experience 
VC’s prior 
10-year 
experience 
no lagged product 
experience 
1-year lagged 
product experience 
2-year lagged 
product experience 
VC’s prior 5-year 
experience, no lagged 
product experience 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
VC 
.054    
(.038) 
.055      
(.038) 
.115*** 
(.037) 
.080* 
(.043) 
.111** 
(.053) 
.067 
(.062) 
.111* 
(.063) 
.055 
(.076) 
.081* 
(.042) 
.042 
(.046) 
VC x VC experience 
.003** 
(.002) 
.003**  
(.001) 
      
.003 
(.002) 
.003* 
(.002) 
VC x product 
experience 
  
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
-.002*** 
(.001) 
product experience   
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004** 
(.002) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
.004*** 
(.001) 
VC x firm age    
.005 
(.003) 
 
.006 
(.004) 
 
.007 
(.004) 
 .005* 
(.003) 
Sales 
.001*    
(.001) 
.001*     
(.001) 
.001** 
(.001) 
.001* 
(.001) 
.001* 
(.001) 
.001* 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001*  
(.001) 
.001* 
(.001) 
Downstream 
capabilities 
.011      
(.231) 
.010        
(.230) 
-.174 
(.246) 
-.110  
(.244) 
-.076 
(.287) 
.002 
(.292) 
.113  
(.365) 
.212 
(.384) 
-.189 
(.238) 
-.122 
(.234) 
Innovations 
.030    
(.091) 
.031       
(.093) 
.009 
(.091) 
-.021   
(.96) 
.003 
(.117) 
-.031 
(.124) 
.024 
(.164) 
-.023 
(.173) 
.008 
(.089) 
-.024 
(.094) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of firms 267 267 267 267 260 260 249 249 267 267 
Number of 
observations 
2325 2325 2325 2325 2058 2058 1798 1798 2325 2325 
Marginal effects  
VC (average) 
063*   
(.035) 
.064*    
(.035) 
.104*** 
(.036) 
.067* 
(.041) 
.101** 
(.050) 
.054 
(.060) 
.100* 
(.059) 
.042 
(.073) 
.079*** 
(.038) 
.038 
(.043) 
VC (VC experience 
=low) 
.054    
(.037) 
.055      
(.038) 
      
.072* 
(.040) 
.031  
(.045) 
VC (VC experience 
=high) 
.074** 
(.033) 
.079**    
(.033) 
      
.088** 
(.036) 
.048  
(.041) 
VC (product 
experience =low) 
  
.115*** 
(.037) 
.080* 
(.043) 
.111** 
(.053) 
.067 
(.062) 
.111* 
(.063) 
.055 
(.076) 
.088** 
(.040) 
.050 
(.045) 
VC (product 
experience =high) 
  
.086*** 
(.033) 
.045  
(.040) 
.083* 
(.046) 
.033 
(.057) 
.080  
(.054) 
.017 
(.069) 
.063* 
(.035) 
.018  
(.041) 
Notes: 1) Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered over firms are in parentheses. 2) * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant 
at 1%. 3) We define VC experience and Product experience to be low when it is at 10th percentile and high when it is at 90th percentile. 4) Although the 
coefficient and the robust standard error of Sales look like the same, it is because we round up the robust standard error to 3-digit. The robust standard 
error of Sales is mostly around .0005, and the coefficient of Sales is mostly significantly positive at 10%. 
Table 4: Add interaction with VC experience and interaction with firm’s product 
experience, OLS model, baseline sample 
The other potential alternative interpretation on the estimate of this interaction is that for the firms that 
received VC financing, one important role of VCs is to help these firms deliver products more 
economically. Given the difficulty in straddling on both the old and new platform, if the VCs expect the 
firms to launch cloud-based products in the foreseeable future, they would guide the firms to strategically 
reduce the current efforts on developing the traditional C/S products. This mechanism would somewhat 
differ from the weaker complementary role of VCs in firms that already invested substantially in their C/S 
products. To probe this possibility, we lag the product experience by one year and by two year, with and 
without the interaction between VC and firm age. The results are reported from columns (5) to (8) in table 
4, which show similar results as the ones using no lagged measure. 
Next we examine a specification that includes the interactions with both VC experience and the firm’s 
product experience. The results are presented in columns (9) and (10) in table 4. If we do not control for 
the interaction of VC and firm age, as shown in column (9), on average, receiving VC financing is 
associated with a 7.9 percentage point increase in the likelihood to launch cloud product; this effect is 
stronger when the VC has high level of IT-related experience, though the difference of the marginal effects 
between high and low level of VC experience becomes somewhat weaker with a p-value of .108. Consistent 
with columns (3) through (8), the role of VC in complementing a firm’s decision to launch cloud seems 
weaker when the firm has gained substantial product experience, and the difference between high and low 
level of product experience is significantly different at the 1% level. In column (10), we add the interaction 
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of VC and firm age. In this case, the economic and statistical significance of VC on a firm’s cloud launch 
decision becomes a bit weaker, though we are still able to observe statistically significant interactions with 
VC experience and firm’s product experience.    
Conclusion 
This study aims to take a first step towards examining the role of VCs in the diffusion of new technological 
platforms through their influences on the start-up firms’ product development decisions. Focusing on 
cloud computing as our empirical setting, our results show a strong complementarity between VC 
financing and cloud offering. This complementarity is more pronounced when the VCs have richer 
technological experience, and is lessened if the startups already have significant experience in the old C/S 
technology.   
Our research highlights the critical role of VCs in the development of a new technological ecosystem. In 
their quest of high valued financial exits, VCs ensure that capital, as well as other necessary resources, are 
channeled to new businesses that either offer these new unproven technological platforms or offer 
products that utilize them. As a consequence, enough products are developed and a vibrant ecosystem is 
formed to make these new platforms viable. Accordingly, from the point of view of industrial dynamics, 
VC investment acts as a coordination and instigation mechanism in ushering new technologies. 
Our research presents several contributions to the literature. While a stream of studies have assessed 
different roles played by VCs in firm innovation (e.g., Hellmann and Puri 2000, Kortum and Lerner 
2000), our study is the first one that focused on VCs’ influence on facilitating the transition to new 
platforms. It also adds to a growing body of IS literature that examines the interplay between VC 
financing and product competition in IT industry (e.g., Kim et al. 2014). By highlighting the importance of 
VCs in catalyzing the transition to new platforms, our study also contributes to a stream of IS studies that 
investigate issues surrounding technological platforms in the IT industry (e.g., Huang et al. 2012). 
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